Abstract. We study the evolution of market-oriented policies over time and across countries. We consider a model in which own and neighbors'past experiences in ‡uence policy choices, through their e¤ect on policymakers' beliefs. We estimate the model using a large panel of countries. We …nd that there is a strong geographical component to learning, which is crucial to explain the slow adoption of liberal policies during the post-war period. Our model also predicts that there would be a substantial reversal to state intervention if nowadays the world was hit by a shock of the size of the Great Depression.
Introduction
The wealth of nations is the central goal of economic policy. Despite their seemingly common objective, policies adopted to foster economic growth di¤er enormously across countries. In addition, these di¤erences tend to persist over time.
Trade policies, which are the focus of this paper, are a prototypical example of these facts.
In this paper we argue that the wide dispersion in trade policies largely re ‡ects to view the market model with suspicion, and a large role for the state with approbation-and it did." [Fischer (1995), p. 102] Date : First version: September 2007. This version: May 2008. We would like to thank Michael Clemens for providing some of the tari¤ data of Clemens and Williamson (2004) and Scott Kastner for sharing the Hiscox and Kastner (2007) openness measure.
In a similar vein, the dismantlement of these ideas was a consequence of the change in views that "resulted from a combination and interaction of research and experience with development and development policy." (Krueger (1997) ) The testimony of an important witness of this era attests this fact: "I remember the foreign minister and the …nance minister from another country saying to me: 'You're the …rst prime minister who is ever tried to roll back the frontiers of socialism. We want to know what's going to happen. Because if you succeed others will follow.'" [Margaret Thatcher in Cran (2002)] Despite this crucial connection among beliefs, policies and economic development, there are very few formal treatments of these mechanisms in the literature. This paper …lls this important gap by proposing a formal model of the evolution of ideas. In particular, we study the dynamics of beliefs about trade policies.
We choose to focus on trade policies for two reasons. First, despite its non-trivial problems, there exist relatively good measures of these policies. More importantly, trade liberalization is often seen as the "sine qua non" of a liberal reform agenda, and thus captures a broader set of policies that are often proposed to foster economic development (Sachs and Warner (1995) ).
More speci…cally, we are motivated by two sets of questions. First, we want to understand whether and why beliefs about trade policies have changed over time:
Can these changes be captured by a rational learning process? How localized is this learning? How fast does this process converge? How dispersed are today's beliefs about the bene…ts of free trade? Secondly, we want to predict how likely are massive policy reversals to protectionism due to possibly large shocks hitting the world economy, e.g. shocks of the size of the Great Depression.
To answer these and similar questions, we model the behavior of benevolent policymakers. Policymakers start with some prior beliefs about the e¤ect of trade openness on economic growth and update these beliefs with the arrival of new information. They decide to open the country to international trade if they think that free trade fosters growth and if political costs entailed by free trade policies are not too large. The introduction of random political costs allows us to quantify the explanatory power of the simple learning mechanism. We estimate the parameters of the model (prior beliefs, geographical structure of learning, and the distribution of political costs) using a panel of 128 countries for the postwar period, 1950-1998. Our estimation results indicate that there is a strong geographical component to learning. The weight assigned to the experience of other countries declines by approximately 40% for every 1000Km (621.37 miles) of physical distance between countries. To illustrate the importance of this estimate, observe that the median country in our dataset has only four countries within 1000Km of distance.
1 The geographical nature of learning is crucial to explain the dynamics of trade policies in the post-war period. Indeed, the model …ts very well the slow adoption of liberal policies and this is attributed to the persistence of beliefs. The learning mechanism rationalizes most of the policy choices (92%) observed in the data. Moreover, it explains 60% of the numerous trade liberalizations towards the end of the century, because the generalized bad growth outcomes of late 1970s and early 1980s were even worse for closed economies. However, the model also indicates that there still exists a substantial dispersion of beliefs by the end of the sample.
This motivates our concern that large shocks might induce a sequence of policy reversals to protectionism. We address this concern by performing a series of counterfactual simulations. Our model predicts that about 10% of the countries would revert to protectionism within 5 years, following a world-wide shock of the size of the Great Depression. We conclude from our exercises that understanding the evolution of beliefs is a central ingredient for the dynamics of policies.
Literature review. Our paper relates to a large literature that studies the determinants of trade policies. This literature mainly explores political economy dimensions, like redistributional issues, interest-group politics, the role of multilateral institutions (see, for example, Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996) , Grossman and Helpman (1995) , Hillman (1989) and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ). Our paper complements this literature by studying the formation and evolution of beliefs about the bene…ts of di¤erent policies. In this respect, our work is more closely related to Piketty (1995) , where policy choices are related to the behavior of rational agents learning from past experience. However, while the analysis of Piketty (1995) is solely theoretical, we attempt to explore the quantitative role played by the evolution of beliefs for policy outcomes. Therefore, we purposely abstract from the political economy aspects, concentrating on tractable models of beliefs formation.
1 The relative development of di¤erent countries, as measured by the di¤erences in their percapita GDP, also determines the relevant information neighborhood.
Models of policymakers as rational learning agents have been successfully applied to explain the rise and fall of US in ‡ation (see, for instance, Sargent (1999) , Cogley and Sargent (2005) , Primiceri (2006) and Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2006) ).
Di¤erently from this literature, policymakers in our paper do not face a complex trade-o¤ between alternative policy objectives. Our focus is instead on a multicountry model and on the role of learning spillovers among countries. In this respect, our paper is related to the literature on social learning and information spillovers in technology adoption and di¤usion (see, for instance, Besley and Case (1994) , Conley and Udry (2005) or Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) ).
Finally, this paper draws from the empirical literature studying the connection between trade and growth (see, for instance, Dollar (1992) , Sachs and Warner (1995) , Edwards (1998) or Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) ). However, while most of this literature investigates the impact of free trade on economic development, our focus is exactly on the converse, i.e. understanding the determinants of trade policies. In this respect, our objective is more similar to Blattman, Clemens, and Williamson (2002) , Clemens and Williamson (2004) and, to a lesser extent, Sachs and Warner (1995) , although none of these papers stresses the importance of past growth performances for current policy choices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a long-term perspective on the evolution of trade policies and beliefs about the bene…ts of free trade. Section 3 examines the dynamics and geography of economic growth and trade policies during the postwar period. Section 4 and 5 present the theoretical model and the estimation methodology. The estimation results and counterfactual exercises are discussed in sections 6 and 7 respectively. Section 8 contains some robustness checks and section 9 concludes.
Trade Policies and Beliefs: A Long-Term View
In this section we examine the behavior of trade policies of leading countries during the 19th and 20th centuries. We also look at the evolution of the dominant views regarding free-trade and protectionism during these centuries. We draw two main conclusions. First, trade policies exhibit large and long lasting cycles.
Important liberalization episodes are followed by large reversals to protectionism.
Second, policy reversals and changes in mainstream views about the optimality of openness to trade followed large aggregate shocks. For instance, after an interval 1816  1822  1828  1834  1840  1846  1852  1858  1864  1870  1876  1882  1888  1894  1900 1906 1912 1918 1924 1930 1936 1942 1948 1954 1960 1966 1972 1978 1984 1990 1996 France of relative freer trade, the world shifted to protectionism after both the "Long"
(1870-1892) and the "Great" (1930s) depressions.
2.1. Evolution of trade policies. Figure 1 plots the behavior of average import tari¤s (weighted by volume) in France, the United Kingdom, the United States.
The …gure also displays a world (unweighted) average. 2 Average tari¤s are commonly used to capture openness to trade in di¤erent periods of history (e.g. Bairoch (1989) , Clemens and Williamson (2004) , Kindleberger (1989) ). Despite important limitations -discussed below-average tari¤s remains a useful measure when interested in a long historical view. The data is taken from Mitchell (1988) for the United Kindom, from Carter, Gartner, Haines, Olmstead, Sutch, and Wright (2006) for the United States and from Mitchell (1992) for France. The world average is taken from Clemens and Williamson (2004 ). For 1865 -1939 This cycle of liberalization is reverted in the late 1870s. This was at least partially a consequence of the "Long Depression," a long period of economic stagnation of most European economies that lasted from around 1870 until at least 1892.
4 Germany, with a major tari¤ reform in 1879, was the …rst large European country that reverted towards protectionism.
The second movement towards freer trade was mainly driven by the decline of transportation costs, rather than explicit trade liberalizations (Bairoch (1989) and Findlay and O'Rourke (2003) ). The renewed trend towards openness can be seen in the aggregate dynamics of trade, and the record ratio of trade-to-GDP right before the …rst world war. European exports grew at 4% on average in the period 1890/2-1913 after a period of relatively slower growth, during the shift to protectionism, 1877/9-1890/2 (Bairoch (1989) ). The ratio of Trade-to-GDP reached 18% in Great
Britain by 1913 (Maddison (2006) (Bairoch (1989) Grossman and Helpman (1995) and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) ). It is less well recognized that the public and policymakers'perception about the desirability of free trade is also an important determinant of trade policies. In turn, it is quite natural to expect that this perception about the bene…ts of trade is a¤ected by past "What an extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man that age was which came to an end in August 1914!...The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, in such quantity as he might see …t, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his doorstep." [Keynes (1919, p. 10) , quoted in Sachs and Warner (1995)] During the 1930s, when most market economies were stagnant while the Soviet Union was growing rapidly, his views on trade were radically di¤erent. In his essay on "National Self-Su¢ ciency" he drastically changes his views: "I sympathize, therefore, with those who would minimize, rather than with those who would maximize, economic entanglement among nations. Ideas, knowledge, science, hospitality, travel-these are the things which should of their nature be international. But let goods be homespun whenever it is reasonably and conveniently possible, and, above all, let …nance be primarily national." [Keynes (1933, p. 3), quoted in Sachs and Warner (1995)] There, Keynes also observes that beliefs are shaken by the Great depression and that countries are looking at each to learn about the consequences of alternative policies:
"But today one country after another abandons these presumptions. Russia is still alone in her particular experiment, but no longer alone in her abandonment of the old presumptions. Italy, Ireland, Germany have cast their eyes, or are casting them, towards new modes of political economy. Many more countries after them, I predict, will seek, one by one, after new economic gods.
Even countries such as Great Britain and the United States, which still conform par excellence to the old model, are striving, under the surface, after a new economic plan. We do not know what will be the outcome. We are-all of us, I expect-about to make many mistakes. No one can tell which of the new systems will prove itself best." [Keynes (1933, p. 3)]
In sum, the two quite opposite discourses can only be understood as a process in which beliefs form and change from policy regimes and outcomes, including those of other countries.
Postwar Dynamics and Geography of Openness
In the rest of the paper, we formally explore the relationship between the dynamics of trade policies and believes by using a large panel of 128 countries from . We use a comprehensive measure of openness proposed by Sachs and Warner (1995) and extended by Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004) . In this section, we describe Sachs and Warner's openness indicator and present some reducedform evidence on the connection between policies and past outcomes that further motivates our formal model of beliefs formation.
3.1. Measuring openness. Sachs and Warner's (1995, hereafter SW) (2000)).
As pointed out in the introduction, this would certainly be a concern if we were interested in investigating the causal relationship between free trade and growth.
However, our focus is rather on understanding how countries performances a¤ect policy choices. Therefore, the fact the SW indicator includes a broader set of policies, represents an important advantage for our analysis.
Of course, one disadvantage of SW is the discrete nature of the openness measure, especially compared to alternative approaches that look at the actual impact of trade distortions. For example, an alternative method is to use empirical models in order to assess the di¤erence between the observed volume of trade and a "freetrade counterfactual." To this end, the well-known gravity equation is a successful empirical tool in replicating observed bilateral trade ‡ows. Moreover, it has gained conceptual support from the work of Anderson and Wincoop (2004) and Eaton and Kortum (2002) , who derive the gravity equation as the equilibrium condition of multicountry general equilibrium models. Along these lines, Hiscox and Kastner (2007) have recently used bilateral trade ‡ows to obtain estimates of the impact of policy distortions over time. Appendix A demonstrates that the SW indicator contains very similar information to the Hiscox and Kastner's measure of openness, for the set of countries for which the latter is available (about 60% of the countries present in the SW dataset).
3.2. Reduced-form evidence. In sum, while most regions display a late and fast opening, they also exhibit well de…ned regional trends. This fact suggests, rather strongly, that regional factors play a key role in determining the policies that countries end up undertaking.
In order to relate policy choices to past growth performances, …gure 2 also plots the (unweighted) average growth rate of per-capita GDP 6 for all countries and only the closed ones. Notice that it is only after the growth collapse of the 1970s and the early 1980s, driven mainly by the closed economies, that the trend towards openness starts. A similar pattern can be observed at the regional level (…gure 3). Initially, most regions were closed and exhibited high average growth. However, South and Central America, Africa and the Middle East decided to switch to openness after the bad performance of the 1970s and 1980s. In addition, observe that openness in the later years of the sample is associated with the resumption of growth.
In order to examine all of these issues more formally, we run a probit model using the SW indicator and GDP growth data for the 128 countries of our sample. The 
From the perspective of policymakers (but not necessarily from ours) openness and growth are linked by a linear, causal relationship. In particular, Given our assumptions, policy decisions are independent over time. Optimal policy at time t is given by Argentinian policymakers believe that the e¤ect of free trade on Argentinian growth is fundamentally di¤erent from the rest of the world, they will update their beliefs using only Argentinian data. On the contrary, if they believe that the growth e¤ect of trade openness is approximately the same in the whole world, the data for every country will carry the same weight as Argentina's own data to update their beliefs.
In order to capture this idea in a ‡exible way, we assume that policymakers of country i believe that the relationship between openness and growth in other 7 Normal-Inverse Gamma priors are standard in linear Gaussian models because they are conjugate priors. For an introduction to Normal-Inverse Gamma distributions and the concept of conjugate prior, see Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (2004). countries is described by the following equations: Under this formulation, policymakers of country i believe in the existence of a linear causal relationship between openness and growth also in other countries.
However, the e¤ect of openness on growth might di¤er across countries. The variable q ij (which scales the "noise" variables c j and o j ) determines how useful data of country j are for country i. In particular, if q ij = 0, the e¤ect of openness in country i and j is the same. Policymakers of country i would then use both sources of data symmetrically to update beliefs. As q ij increases, data from country j become less and less informative about the growth e¤ect of openness in country i.
We assume that q ij is a parametric function of a vector of covariates z ij :
We borrow this formulation from the literature on geographically weighted regressions (see, for instance, Fotheringnam, Brunsdon, and Charlton (2002) ). The vector z ij may include various measures of physical as well as cultural distance between country i and j. This speci…cation captures the idea that policymakers attach more weight to countries that are closer geographically and culturally to the home country.
Under the additional assumption that the vector f j g N j=1 is known to policymakers, 8 Bayes law induces simple updating rules for^ i;t E i;t ([ . to data coming from country j.
Inference
Like the agents of our model, we ( : correlation of initial beliefs about the e¤ect of closeness and openness
: standard deviation of the political cost : coe¢ cients of the weighting function
If we collect the set of unknown coe¢ cients in the vector and denote by D the entire set of available data on openness and growth, standard application of Bayes rule delivers:
where p ( ), L ( ) and ( ) denote the posterior, sampling and prior densities respectively. We now turn to the description of the priors and the construction of the likelihood function.
5.1. Priors. Our model is quite heavily parameterized. The use of somewhat informative priors helps preventing over…tting problems. For instance, we would like to avoid cases in which we …t the data well, but only due to estimates of policymakers' initial beliefs which are clearly implausible. As an example, consider the literature on macroeconomic forecasting: highly parameterized models do well insample, but perform poorly out-of-sample. The use of priors considerably improves the forecasting performance of these models (see, for instance, Sims and Zha (1998) or, more recently, Banbura, Giannone, and Reichlin (2007)). The role of priors is similar in our context, as our ultimate goal is using the model to conduct a set of counterfactual experiments.
We assume the following prior densities: We now turn to the description of the parameterization of the priors:
We set The value of ! is set to 0:025, which implies a quite agnostic view about the mean of initial beliefs.
We choose a and b such that i has an a-priori mean equal to 0 and a standard deviation equal to 0:4. Overall, this prior is very di¤use and does not play much of a role for the results of the paper. 9 We select s and d so that i;k has an a-priori mean and standard deviation equal to 0:01. The idea here is trying to discourage the model from …tting the data using very large variances of the exogenous political cost K it . This prior distribution implies that, if policymakers believe that growth under openness is 1% higher than under closeness, they will open the country to free trade with probability 87% on average (standard deviation 10%).
As the coe¢ cients are common to all countries, we use a ‡at prior for . 9 We use a beta prior on initial uncertainty about the e¤ects of openness and closeness on economic growth. This parameter is important because it a¤ects the speed of learning, especially for those countries for which fewer data are available. In our baseline estimation we set this parameter to a …xed value. This is because weak identi…cation makes it very hard to estimate simultaneously 2 and in (4.3). Since the SW indicator is not available before 1950, it is much easier to come up with a reasonable value for 2 rather than for . In calibrating 2 we …rst observe that 
where C is a constant which does not depend on . In turn, the conditional density L( i;t jD t 1 ; ) can be written as
, where ( ) denotes the cdf of a standard Gaussian density. These results are derived in appendix D.
10 This can be seen by combining (4.2) and (4.3) and noticing that we cannot distinguish between open and closed countries in the pre 1950 data. 11 There is a huge outlier in the distribution of the average growth rates across countries.
Therefore, this variance is estimated with a robust method (squared average distance from the median of the 16 and 84th percentiles).
Results
This section presents the estimation results and various measures of …t for our baseline speci…cation of the model. Extensions of the baseline model and robustness checks are presented in section 8.
6.1. Estimation results: the weighting function. In our baseline speci…cation, the weight that country i assigns to the data of country j (w ij ) is a function of a constant and two additional variables: d ij , physical distance (in thousands of Km)
between the capital of country j and country i, and`i j , a dummy variable equal one if countries i and j have the same o¢ cial language. In other words,
in expression (4.7). Everything else equal, countries put more weight on data from countries nearby. data. The other conclusion that can be drawn from table 1 is that language matters: speaking the same language increases the weight by a factor larger than two.
With this information in hand we …rst ask: Is learning globalized across the countries of the world? The answer is no. Learning appears to be quite localized instead. Figure 5 plots the histogram of f
, i.e. the total weight assigned by each country to the rest of the world, relative to the weight assigned to their own data. There are essentially no countries that weight equally the data from all the other countries. However, learning is not isolated either, as the weight put on data from other countries is substantial: there are very few cases (only three cases) in which own data receive more weight than the rest of the world.
The weighting function plays an important role in our analysis. In the next sections we will analyze its contribution to the evolution of policymakers' beliefs about the e¤ect of trade openness on growth. Moreover, in section 8, we will analyze the robustness of our results to alternative speci…cations of this weighting function.
6.2. Estimation results: evolution of beliefs. Figure 6 presents a summary of the estimated evolution of beliefs over time and across countries. We now ask the important question: Has the world reached a point in which the vast majority of policymakers are convinced that free trade is bene…cial for economic growth? Figure 6b and c tell us that this is certainly not the case. There still exists a considerable amount of negative views about openness, and many of those with a favorable view would not believe that the gains of openness to be quantitatively large.
6.3. The model' s …t. Before reporting our counterfactual experiments, it is important to assess how well our model …ts the data. Using di¤erent criteria, we will argue that the model explains quite well the dynamics of trade policies over time and across countries. indicates that identi…cation might be weak in some instances, it also suggests that large political costs are essentially never needed to …t the data on the evolution of policies. predictions is larger than 10%, in very few cases this number is larger than 40%.
In our sample this is true for only 2 countries: Jamaica and M orocco.
We conclude this section by comparing the …t of our baseline model to two alternative speci…cations. First, we assume that countries only learn from their own past data (M own ). Second, we assume that countries learn globally, putting the same weight to the data of every country in the world as its own (M all ). Table   2 reports the value of the log-likelihood of our baseline speci…cation and of these two alternative models. There are two things to notice: …rst, our model dominates 12 Compared to the alternatives, our model has 3 additional parameters. Nevertheless, both a likelihood ratio test or the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) would easily reject the restricted models. Of course the formal way of performing a model comparison exercise in a Bayesian framework would be based on the comparison of the marginal data densities. However, the computation of the marginal data density is computationally quite expensive for these models. We leave this extension for future work.
Counterfactuals
In this section we answer two questions:
(1) Do spillovers of information matter for the di¤ usion of free trade?
(2) Would the world revert to protectionism if it was hit by another Great Depression?
We will argue that the answer to both of these questions is yes.
We answer these questions using counterfactual simulations of the model. Suppose that time is the starting point of the counterfactuals. These simulations are constructed as follows: based on time beliefs and the realization of the exogenous political cost at time +1, policymakers choose the value of the policy variable; this policy choice contributes to the realization of the value of GDP growth in period + 1; a new vintage of data is now available and policymakers form time + 1 beliefs by updating their priors with the new information; and so on.
Contrary to the rest of the paper, for our counterfactuals we need to postulate a true data generating process for GDP growth. To keep things simple, we simulate the realization of GDP growth in every period using the following stochastic process:
s + e i;s , s = + 1; :::; + H (7.1)
where H denotes the length of the simulation and f i;s is an exogenous forcing variable that allows us, for instance, to simulate the e¤ects of the Great Depression. We obtain speci…c values for c , o and $ equal to the variances of the residuals.
Unless otherwise noticed, the other model parameters (initial beliefs, volatility of the political costs and coe¢ cients of the weighting function) are set to the estimated posterior mode.
Before turning to the description of the results of these experiments, we want to stress that the results of this section are conditional on (7.1), i.e. the particular data generating process that we have chosen for GDP growth. The process in (7.1) has two main advantages. First, it is transparent and easy to cast into our model. Second, it closely resembles the growth regressions that we assume our policymakers estimate to update their beliefs. Therefore, if the forcing variable is set to f i;s = 0, then our learning model eventually converges to a self-con…rming equilibrium in which everybody knows the truth. On the other hand, in using (7.1), we are making the strong assumption that the residuals of the GDP growth equation (e i;s ) are uncorrelated with the policy variable ( i;s ). While this is the case in our model, 13 it is possible to imagine situations in which this condition fails.
The most obvious of these situations is, for instance, a case in which the shocks to GDP growth (e i;s ) are not independent from the political cost (K i;s ). In sum, we conclude that the localization of learning might have severely slowed down the global di¤usion of openness to international trade.
7.2. Policy reversals: another Great Depression. Motivated by the historical evidence in section 2.1, we now consider the impact of negative global shocks on the openness of countries. To accomplish this task we also conduct a counterfactual simulation exercise. Contrary to the previous subsection, we keep the estimated weighting scheme, but introduce a forcing variable ff i;s g H s=1 in the growth data generating process (7.1) to induce a global depression. We calibrate ff i;s g Summing up, would we observe policy reversals towards protectionism if the world was hit by a severe recession? The answer of our model is yes. -817.0118 -814.2882 -756.76 -792.4437 -833.63 TABLE 3: Estimates of the coe¢ cients of the weighting function in the baseline model and various alternative models (described in sections 8.1 and 8.2).
Observe that the inclusion of log-total GDP (s ij ) alone leaves the results essentially unchanged. However, the …t improves substantially when the weighting function is augmented to include income di¤erences between countries (a ij ). In particular, notice that the coe¢ cient on a ij is positive, indicating that policymakers …nd more informative the experience of countries with a di¤erent level of development. This is probably due to the desire to imitate more developed countries and stay away from the negative experiences of less developed countries. Finally, observe that the coe¢ cient on s ij is negative, perhaps contrary to intuition. In any case, we will see below that the quantitative e¤ect is rather small. Another concern might be that colonizers receive a disproportionately large or small weight from previous colonies. Column 4 in Table 3 reports the estimation results using the new variable c ij , a dummy variable equal one if country j has been a colonizer of country i. Notice that there is an improvement in …t with respect to the baseline speci…cation and that the coe¢ cient on distance remains basically unchanged. However, given the correlation between language and colonial links, the coe¢ cient on language becomes smaller. Finally, notice that the weight depends negatively on having been a colonizer, although this coe¢ cient is far from being statistically signi…cant.
To understand the economic di¤erences of alternative models, we now examine the evolution of beliefs implied by the di¤erent models. In particular, Figure 13 plots the evolution of the di¤erence between median expected growth under openness and closeness. All the models tell essentially the same story about the evolution of beliefs.
Finally, …gure 14 analyzes the probability of policy reversals after a severe recession. As in section 7.2, we simulate the e¤ect of another Great Depression we estimate a di¤erent i for each country and …x to zero. In estimating i we use an IG prior density with mean and standard deviation equal to p 0:0696, which is the value we used to calibrate in the baseline exercise. Finally, observe that we eliminate the constant from the vector of covariates z ij because it is not separately identi…ed from i .
The coe¢ cient estimates of the weighting function and the model's …t are reported as M 5 in Table 3 . The value of the log-likelihood indicates that the baseline model is preferred. Notice also that the coe¢ cients show some changes with respect to the baseline speci…cation, but these changes have very moderate economic consequences. In fact, …gure 13 and 14 show the similar implications of the model for the behavior of policymakers'beliefs and the consequences of a counterfactual severe recession.
We conclude that our results are robust.
9. Concluding Remarks 
where M ijt are the imports of country i from country j in year t; Y it and Y jt denote GDP of the importing and exporting country, respectively; d ij is the "distance" between importing country i and exporting country j and u ijt is white noise error.
Here, it is an intercept that varies across importing countries and across time but not across exporters to that country. HK use these estimated country-year dummy variables as an indicator of the openness to trade of countries. A large value of it indicates that the country imports more than predicted gravity and hence is more open to trade than the average of the countries-year. HK normalize the values of it as a fraction of the highest value in the sample, which for is Belgium in 1980. Such normalization is clearly arbitrary but helps indicate how far are the countries from a free-trade benchmark. Interestingly, I HK and the SW indicator (hereafter I SW ) are highly correlated.
Combining these datasets, we have information for both indicators for 73 countries for most of the years between 1960 and 1998. 15 For this sample, the simple correlation between these two indicators is 0.68, a very high number since it captures the correlation between a dummy and a continuous variable. I SW captures much of the variation in I HK . The sample average of I HK is 60:2%, but is 71:2% for the country-years for which I SW = 1, while it is only 51:1% when I SW = 0. Under the interpretation of HK, openness in the sense of SW on average increases the ratio of imports-to-GDP by more than 20%, which is a value also higher than the standard deviation of 16:2% of I HK . Figure 15 In sum, despite their very di¤erent nature and construction, I SW and I HK appear to largely convey the same information with respect to openness. For instance, it is widely held that, after a number or reversals, the second half of the 20th century is a period in which the world advanced towards greater openness (e.g. Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) and Findlay and O'Rourke (2003) ). Figure 16 shows, for each year,
the fraction of open countries, i.e. I SW = 1. This is done using the entire sample of 128 countries for which we have I SW data, and also for the reduced sample of 73 countries for which we can combine it with I HK data. The …gure shows that the two I HK series display essentially the same trends. The higher number in the restricted sample is the result that countries for which data were missing are typically transition or less developed countries, which tend to be initially closed.
Obviously, the nature of these series is very di¤erent and the magnitudes of change are not comparable. Three features of the data come up in table 4. First, policies are very persistent (…rst row). The probability that a country who was opened in period t 1 is opened in period t is from 67 to 75 percentage points larger than that of countries that were closed in period t 1. Second, trade policies are spatially correlated We can now substitute equations (4.5) and (4.6) into (C.1). We obtain 18 it is easy to show that the optimal updating formulas for the expectation of policymakers'beliefs in country i are: 
Appendix D. The likelihood function
The likelihood function can be written as a product of conditional densities:
Under the assumption that the distribution of the vector y t [y 1;t ; :::; y N;t ] 0 depends on only through the vector t [ 1;t ; :::; N;t ] 0 , it follows that
Combining (D.1) and (D.3), we obtain the following result:
where C is a constant which does not depend on .
Since the policy decision is given by , where ( ) denotes the cdf of a standard Gaussian density.
